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1. Introduction 
The contrast between national intellectual property rights, which are still granted on the basis of the 
territoriality principle, and which, as a consequence, logically produce on the one hand parallel rights in 
several countries and on the other hand the international exploitation of such rights, results in a scenario 
where similar violations, mostly performed by defendants with a mutual relationship between them, give 
rise to claims based on similar national provisions on intellectual property. Article 2 of Brussels I 
Regulation allows for the separate prosecution of every defendant in the country where he or she resides. 
Although Article 5(3) provides for an alternative solution, the standard scenario involves a multitude of 
claims submitted country by country, apparently as a logical consequence of the territoriality principle.1 
Intellectual Property has been the object of considerable harmonization over the years, on the basis of 
both international treaties and European Union law. Without going too much into details, it is obvious that 
the combination of territorial (national) intellectual property rights and their exploitation beyond national 
boundaries raises questions related with the possible application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation. A forum connexitatis offers in fact the possibility to pursue the infringement of what, from a 
commercial point of view, is often considered as a single right, rather than a bundle of parallel national 
intellectual property rights. Thus, the patent infringement performed in a uniform manner, for example by 
the commercialization of a copy of the patented product by related defendants, is pursued as an single case 
before a single court. Article 6(1) offers therefore an interesting opportunity in a number of intellectual 
property cases. However, Article 6(1) is principally targeted at defendants residing in different Member 
States acting with a common agenda,2 and this is in contrast with the most common scenario of 
intellectual property rights infringement, which involves both parallel rights and defendants that act 
(individually) in a parallel fashion, whether or not they act within a group of companies. 
Hopes that the recent reform of the Brussels I Regulation would bring clarification on this point, since the 
existing jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice was not generally supported by intellectual 
property doctrine and practitioners, have unfortunately not been fulfilled. Except for the fact that the 
concerned defendant is now expressly defined, nothing changes in the existing text of the Article 6(1) 
which now becomes Article 8(1).3 Legal practice must therefore continue to work with the following text 
of the new Article 8 (the new fragment is within parenthesis): 
'[A person domiciled in a Member State] may also be sued: 
1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the  
place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so  
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them  
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from  
separate proceedings; 
2.[...]' 
                                                          
1
 See J.J. Fawcett and P. Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law, (2nd ed., 2011), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Ch. 5.  
2
 For example: Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership Ltd [2000] Ch 403 and Chiron Corp. v. Evans Medical Ltd and Others 
[1996] FSR 863. 
3
 See http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/nl/12/pe00/pe00056.nl12.pdf . 
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Debating the causes of this status quo is not very useful for legal practice. Whether it is an absence of 
consensus on a modified text or a confirmation of the Court's interpretation of Article 6(1) is of limited 
interest. Legal practice must in fact continue working with the existing jurisprudence of the Court.4 This 
contribution attempts therefore to clarify the Court's current position.  
2. The Starting Point: Roche Nederland 
A lot has been written about Roche Nederland.5 At the very least, one can state that this judgment is 
controversial,6 but it is nonetheless the starting point of the debate. This was the first time that the Court 
had received a case aiming at the potential application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation in a case 
concerning intellectual property rights.  In short, Primus and Goldenberg had filed an application for a 
European patent; and they had obtained a patent, according to the European Patent Convention, as a 
bundle of national patents. They claimed that the Roche group had infringed their European patent. In 
practice the infringement was performed in each country, every time by the local branch of the Roche 
group, but the case was handled and coordinated by the group's central unit. Therefore, it would have been 
useful for Primus and Goldenberg to have the whole case treated by a single court. This was also possible 
because Dutch courts had developed for the purposes of Article 6(1) the so-called 'spider in the web' 
doctrine.7 The Roche case seemed to be a typical case. The spider’s web of patent infringement had been 
weaved, or at least conceived, by the central unit of the group. The local branches merely carried out this 
strategy. Why not to entrust the coordinated infringement of the European patent to a single court, the 
court of the spider, whose competence was recognised by Article 6(1)? 
Yet, was the existence of a spider at the centre of the web of patent infringement the right starting point? 
According to the text of Article 6(1), the presence of a spider implies a link between the claims, doubtlessly 
a close link. However, this is not what Article 6(1) requires.  Article 6(1) requires that the cases are 'so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings'. A risk of irreconcilable judgments is the 
conditio sine qua non to apply Article 6(1) which constitutes a derogation to Article 2 and takes away one 
or more defendants from the forum of their domicile. Different judges can rule differently on a particular 
case, even if their decision is grounded on the same facts and on the same law. But Article 6(1) does not 
have the purpose to prevent such divergence. The only risk that needs to be averted is that of 
contradictory judgments that are incompatible between them. This risk exists only if two judges of two 
countries decide, on each side, on the same factual and legal situation.8 If we take an example from the 
field of intellectual property rights, this risk exists if the defendant A, domiciled in X, together with the 
defendant B, domiciled in Y, manufactures in Z reproductions of an artwork by an author, without the 
author's authorization, and puts them on the market. If a judge in  country X exerts her jurisdiction on the 
basis of Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation over defendant A, and another judge in the country Y does 
the same in relation to defendant B, both judges would decide the same dispute. In this case there is the 
risk that the same activity performed together in the country Z by the two parties (and to which the law of 
                                                          
4
 J.J. Fawcett and P. Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law, above, para. 5.115  et seq.;  for the 
national jurisprudence see M. Pertegas-Sender, Cross-Border Enforcement of Patent Rights, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, paras. 3.19-3.55 and C. Gonzalez-Beilfuss, ‘Is there any Web for the spider? Jurisdiction over co-defendants after 
Roche Nederland’ in A. Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual Property and Information Technology, Ch. 4, 
pp. 81-83. 
5
 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535. 
6
 J.J. Fawcett and P. Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law, above, para. 11.05 et seq.  and A. 
Kur, ‘A Farewell to Crossborder Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT v. LuK and Roche Nederland v. Primus and 
Goldenberg’ 37(2006) IIC, pp. 844 – 855. 
7
 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Expandable Grafts Partnership v. Boston Scientific BV [1999] FSR 352.  
8
 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535 para. 26. 
3 | P a g e  
Z if probably applicable) is considered by one of the judges as an infringement  and by the other judge as a 
perfectly lawful activity. These decisions would therefore be incompatible between them.9 
 
The Court of Justice has ruled, in Roche Netherland, that the condition of the same factual situation was not 
met.10 According to the Court each branch operated in a separate country and the details of the patent 
infringement were different in each country. The infringing activity was also performed in different 
countries by each defendant. In other words, there was no joint activity in a particular country, and there 
were no overlapping infringing activities or defendants. There were purely parallel factual situations, 
territorial and national. In addition, the Court argued that this case was not even subject to the same law, 
because the European patent consists of a number of national patents and is granted as such. Each of these 
patents is subject to national patent law and these patents are independent from each other. This is 
certainly the case when patent infringement is expressly covered by national law.11 
If we are ready to follow the analysis of the Court on this point, there is no question of irreconcilable 
judgments.  Every defendant must answer for her deeds in a specific factual and legal situation. There is no 
factual situation involving several defendants jointly, and every form of overlapping is avoided. The need 
for claims 'closely connected' cannot be demonstrated despite the similarities among national cases, and 
Article 6(1) is not applicable because the conditions required by the text of this article are not met.12 
The 'spider in the web' doctrine argues that there is a supplementary factor to be considered, in addition 
to the web of coordinated activities: the planning by the spider. The forum connexitatis therefore is 
identified with the location where the spider is based. Given this additional factor, it is desirable to bring 
the cases before an individual judge because of the close link resulting from the coordination by the spider.  
However, in the analysis of the Court there is no room for this supplementary step. The Court is not able to 
go this far and it does not apply the 'spider in the web' doctrine because the requirements of the wording 
of Article 6(1) are not met.13 
3. Freeport as a First Correction?  
To be honest, the Freeport14 case has nothing to do with intellectual property rights. It was essentially 
about two connected cases against two defendants on the basis of different legal situations, namely the 
contractual responsibility on the one hand and the tortious liability on the other hand. And this was 
exactly the most criticised point of   Roche Nederland. National patent law is largely harmonised and 
national rules on patent infringement are all translations in national law of Article 69 of the European 
Patent Convention and of the Protocol to this article.  The strict application of the territoriality principle to 
a case concerning the infringement of a European patent on the basis that this cannot be a single legal 
situation is perhaps a little too simplistic.  The Freeport case has given the Court the opportunity to re-
examine the requirement of the single legal situation, and therefore this judgment becomes of crucial 
importance for our analysis. 
                                                          
9
  See Ph. de Jong, O. Vrins and Ch. Ronse, 'Evoluties in het octrooirecht' [2011] 11 TBH and Zheng Sophia Tang, 
'Multiple defendants in the European Jurisdiction Regulation' (2009) European Law Review 80.  
10
  Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535 para. 27. See K. 
Szychowska, 'Quelques observations sous les arrêts de la Cour de justice dans les affaires C-4/03 GAT et C-539/3 
Roche', [2007] 5 RDC 498-506. 
11
 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535, paras. 29-31. 
12
 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535, para. 33. See 
J.J. Brinkhof, 'HvJEG beperkt mogelijkheden van grensoverschrijdende verboden', (2006) Bijblad Industriële Eigendom 
319-322. 
13
 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535, paras. 34-35. 
14
 Case C-98/06 Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson  [2007] ECR I-8319.  
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The Court goes immediately to the point. The requirement of an identical legal situation is softened, one 
year only after Roche Nederland. The identity of the legal foundations of the claims, for example an 
identical provision on patent infringement in the national patent law, as in Roche, is not required.15  For 
the rest, the analysis of the Court appears familiar: 
‘38. It is not apparent from the wording of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 that the 
conditions laid down for application of that provision include a requirement that the actions 
brought against different defendants should have identical legal bases. 
39. As the Court has already held, for Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention to apply, it must be 
ascertained whether, between various claims brought by the same plaintiff against different 
defendants, there is a connection of such a kind that it is expedient to determine those actions 
together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings (Kalfelis, paragraph 13). 
40. The Court has had occasion to point out that, in order that decisions may be regarded as 
contradictory, it is not sufficient that there be a divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but that 
divergence must also arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact (Case 
C-539/03 Roche Nederland and Others [2006] ECR I-6535, paragraph 26). 
41. It is for the national court to assess whether there is a connection between the different claims 
brought before it, that is to say, a risk of irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined 
separately and, in that regard, to take account of all the necessary factors in the case-file, which 
may, if appropriate yet without its being necessary for the assessment, lead it to take into 
consideration the legal bases of the actions brought before that court.'16 
The emphasis is again on the risk of irreconcilable judgments. A simple divergence is not sufficient; and 
there must be a connection so close as to produce the risk of irreconcilable judgments.  This requires an 
identical factual situation and a converging legal situation, even though the latter condition is equally 
satisfied if there is a different legal basis for each case. Moreover, the Court introduces some flexibility on 
this second condition. The national judge must consider every aspect, including an identical juridical basis, 
if that is the case, although this aspect is not decisive, and she must decide if there is a risk of 
irreconcilable judgments.17 
Also the rules of national patent law that are only partially harmonised are no longer an obstacle. The 
Roche Nederland approach is clearly softened on this point18 and Article 6(1) would certainly be applicable 
today if two branches of Roche would jointly infringe a patent by performing the same activity in two 
different countries. Even a different legal basis, as the infringement of a patent in country A and a case of 
unfair competition based on the infringement of an exclusive right in country B, would not make a 
difference.19 
4. The Painer Case: the Next Step? 
                                                          
15
  See Zheng Sophia Tang, 'Multiple defendants in the European Jurisdiction Regulation' (2009) European Law Review 
80.  
16
  Case C-98/06 Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson  [2007] ECR I-8319, paras. 38-41. 
17
  Case C-98/06 Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson  [2007] ECR I-8319, para. 54.  
18
 M. Polak, 'Als u begrijpt wat ik bedoel': het Hof van Justitie herinterpreteert zijn rechtspraak over rechterlijke 
bevoegdheid bij pluraliteit van verweerders, (2007) 12 Ars Aequi 990-995 and http://www.arsaequi.nl/maandblad (1er 
juil. 2008). 
19
  See J. Bomhoff, 'Freeport v Arnoldsson: Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation' cited by M. George on the blog 
Conflictoflaws.net (http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/freeport-v-arnoldsson-art-61-of-the-brussels-i-regulation/). 
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The least you can say is that the Court of Justice performs a peculiar analysis in the Painer case.20 Here the 
Freeport doctrine is applied to a case concerning intellectual property rights, but this is not in itself very 
interesting. More interesting, on the contrary, is what is missing from the analysis of the Court on this case.  
The factual situation in Painer is relatively simple. Ms Painer is a photographer and she takes pictures of 
children in schools. She keeps her copyright on the images that she sells. In this capacity, she took a picture 
of Natascha Kampusch before her kidnapping. After the kidnapping the Austrian police used the picture of 
Natascha Kampusch in their search and have therefore diffused the picture, which allowed a press photo 
agency to offer this picture to some newspapers after the escape of Natascha Kampusch, at a time when 
new pictures were not yet available. 
Ms Painer claims that the publication in the German and Austrian newspapers infringes her copyright. She 
sues both German and Austrian newspaper publishers before an Austrian court, on the basis of Article 
6(1) Brussels I Regulation. It needs to be noted that some German publishers were not active in the 
Austrian market, despite the fact that all publishers performed the same activity in relation to the picture, 
that is the publication of the picture obtained by the agency (retouched with the ageing software of the 
police). 
4.1. The Analysis of the European Court of Justice 
The Court strongly emphasizes that copyright law, which protects the picture at hand, has been 
harmonised by  different European directives. It is as if the Court sought to explain that the requirement of 
the same legal situation of Roche Nederland is almost met. However, immediately afterwards the Court 
cites Freemont, with the purpose of dismissing21 some minor divergences between national copyright laws 
(of Germany and Austria), because an identical juridical basis is no longer necessary.22 
At first the Court has ruled on the basis that these are identical cases of copyright infringement. However, 
the national judge had indicated a potential problem in the different national juridical bases: 
'72 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6(1) of Regulation No 
44/2001 must be interpreted as precluding its application if actions against several defendants for 
substantially identical copyright infringements are brought on national legal grounds which vary 
according to the Member States concerned.’23  
This problem is dismissed with a strong reference to Freeport: 
‘79 In that regard, the Court has stated that, in order for judgments to be regarded as 
irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, it is not sufficient that 
there be a divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but that divergence must also arise in the 
same situation of fact and law (see Freeport, paragraph 40). 
80 However, in assessing whether there is a connection between different claims, that is to say a 
risk of irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined separately, the identical legal 
bases of the actions brought is only one relevant factor among others. It is not an indispensable 
requirement for the application of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 (see, to that 
effect, Freeport, paragraph 41). 
81 Thus, a difference in legal basis between the actions brought against the various defendants, 
does not, in itself, preclude the application of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, provided 
                                                          
20
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6. 
21
  And since the difference is so negligible, this cannot become an important factor when the judge takes in 
consideration all factors.  
22
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6, paras. 72 et 82. 
23
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6, para. 72. 
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however that it was foreseeable by the defendants that they might be sued in the Member State 
where at least one of them is domiciled (see, to that effect, Freeport, paragraph 47).’24 
The predictability for the defendant of the venue of the prospective litigation is one of the foundations of 
the Brussels I Regulation, and it is therefore always present. But it is nonetheless interesting to note that 
the Court links this aspect specifically to a discretional appreciation of the legal situation and to the 
absence of the requirement of an identical juridical basis. This discretional appreciation is somehow 
dependant on the predictability of the competent court by the defendant. This last aspect is almost a 
conditio sine qua non for the discretional application of Article 6(1). 
The reduced importance of the requirement of the same juridical basis is, according to the Court, the result 
of the strong harmonization of national legislation: 
'82 That reasoning is stronger if, as in the main proceedings, the national laws on which the 
actions against the various defendants are based are, in the referring court’s view, substantially 
identical.’25 
The more the national law is harmonised,26 the stronger are the arguments in favour of the application of 
Article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation. It is striking that the Court refrains from making any reference to Roche 
Nederland on this point. The analysis of Roche is not openly abandoned, but neither is it used to support 
the analysis in Painer. However, in consideration of the importance that the Court places on the 
harmonization of national legislation in a scenario where a unique juridical basis is no longer an 
obligation, it is no longer possible to accept the argument in Roche Nederland that, despite a strong 
harmonization, the infringement of a European patent is based on independent national laws, and that for 
this only reason irreconcilable judgments are impossible.  
The Court further goes back to the fundamental requirement of the close connection between cases and to 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments: 
‘83 It is, in addition, for the referring court to assess, in the light of all the aspects of the case, 
whether there is a connection between the different claims brought before it, that is to say a risk 
of irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined separately. For that purpose, the fact 
that defendants against whom a copyright holder alleges substantially identical infringements of 
his copyright did or did not act independently may be relevant.’27 
At this point, there is a notable addition. In Painer the question why it was necessary to examine the claims 
jointly if the defendants did not act in mutual agreement cannot be avoided. According to the narrative of 
the facts in the judgment, the publishers of different newspapers have decided in full independence to 
purchase the contentious pictures and to publish them without the authorization of Ms Painer. This might 
suggest that the absence of every form of agreement or coordination, without mentioning the presence of 
a spider, is in itself sufficient to reject the application of Article 6(1), unless there is a common form of 
action. But not so in the analysis of the Court. The fact that the defendants have acted in an independent 
fashion is not decisive. The Court is satisfied with adding this argument, of a certain importance, to the list 
                                                          
24
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6, paras. 79-81. 
25
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6, para. 82. 
26
 See the analysis of the copyright judgment by V.-L. Benabou, 'Arrêt « Painer » : la protection par le droit d'auteur 
d'une photographie de portrait utilisée à des fins de recherche d'une personne disparue', (2012) 189 JDE 146-148 and 
M.-C. Janssens, 'Het Hof van Justitie over de auteursrechtelijke bescherming van foto's', (2012) 1 Le droit des affaires - 
Het ondernemingsrecht (D.A.-O.R.) 127.  
27
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6, para. 83. 
7 | P a g e  
of the aspects that national courts have to consider to determine if there is a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments.28 
4.2. What the Court Omits to Say … but what Forms an Essential Aspect of the Question 
Advocate general Trstenjak had suggested that the Court could establish a somewhat different criterion to 
determine the application of Article 6(1).29 Her conclusion starts from the idea that the forum connexitatis 
can only be declared competent for the claims that have a close connection with the principal claim. In 
other words, a principal claim is always present, and every other claim is connected to this claim by a close 
link. It is however not possible to link further claims to these attached claims that in turn would play the 
role of principal claim. This structure as well reinforces the aspect of predictability of the venue for the 
application of Article 6(1). In Painer, the principal claim concerned the newspaper published in Austria, 
the copyright infringement by this publication, and the reproduction in this publication of the pictures of 
Ms Painer by a defendant domiciled in Austria.30 The 'other' claims were based on newspapers published 
in Germany. These latter claims need to have a close link with the principal claim. Moreover, the mutual 
relationship (or its absence) between the claims concerning newspapers published in Germany is 
immaterial. In this logic, a claim against a publisher based in Germany concerning the publication of a 
newspaper in Austria cannot serve as a principal claim with which the claim concerning a newspaper 
published in Germany, for example a local edition or a sister paper, has a close link. The text of Article 6(1) 
points clearly in this direction.31 
The close nature of the link between the principal claim and the 'other' claims, according to the advocate 
general, must be demonstrated by the existence of a single factual situation. This somewhat different 
criterion softens the approach in Roche Nederland, but the main idea remains the predictability of the 
venue of proceedings for the defendant.32 Parallel behaviour is therefore not sufficient; the various 
behaviours should at least be aligned. The advocate general expresses this essential nuance in the 
following way: 
'92. That minimum requirement is not satisfied where the facts on which the applicant bases its 
anchor claim and the other claim are such that the conduct of the anchor defendant and of the 
other defendant concerns the same or similar legal interests of the applicant and is similar in 
nature, but occurs independently and without knowledge of one another. In such a case of 
unconcerted parallel conduct, it is not sufficiently predictable for the other defendant that he can 
also be sued, under Article 6(1) of the regulation, at a court in the place where the anchor 
defendant is domiciled ’33 
This is exactly one of the problems in Painer. The publishers of the different newspapers have behaved in 
an identical way, but no alignment appears among these behaviours. In Roche Nederland, the Court has 
rejected the application of Article 6(1) arguing the absence of a single factual situation. There, it was 
question of coordinated actions by companies belonging to the same group. But according to the Court the 
presence of different defendants for different claims was sufficient, in the sense that for each claim there is 
a different defendant and that the infringing acts differ somewhat from country to country. It is therefore 
clear that the strict requirement of Roche Nederland is not met in Painer. This is why it is even more 
                                                          
28
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6, para. 83. 
29
  Conclusions of Advocate General Trstenjak in case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al., [2011] 
ECDR 13, para. 86. 
30
  Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation remains the fundamental principle, and in derogation to this principle another 
defendant may likewise be brought before a forum connexitatis determined on the basis of Article 2.  
31
  Conclusions of Advocate General Trstenjak in case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al., [2011] 
ECDR 13, paras. 87-90.  
32
  Conclusions of Advocate General Trstenjak in case C-145/10 above, para. 01.  
33
  Conclusions of Advocate General Trstenjak in  case C-145/10 above, para. 92.  
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surprising that the Court did not make the effort to explain why it did not follow either this approach, or 
the somewhat softer approach proposed by the advocate general. By both arguments Article 6(1) would 
not be applicable to Painer. The court prefers not to reach this conclusion and reduces the requirement of 
a single factual situation to one of the factors that a court must consider in the evaluation of the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments. This is moreover achieved by a little added sentence, without any motivation or 
clarification. It would have been at least interesting to know whether the Court considers sufficient the 
argument that in Painer the infringing acts were identical and took place in part in the same jurisdiction. 
Has the requirement of an identical factual situation survived because of the risk that the same acts 
performed in Austria are judged in a different and irreconcilable way respectively by a German tribunal 
and by an Austrian tribunal, although for different defendants ? Or are we then just dealing with an 
acceptable form of divergence? Or does the court now assess the risk of incompatibility in one step in 
which both factors indicating the same facts and proofs relating to the legal basis are taken into account?  
The ruling of the Court of Justice does not give any clarification on this point, despite the clear way 
indicated by the conclusions of the advocate general. Conversely, there is no longer a place for the strict 
line of Roche Nederland. 
The advocate general considers a legal link sufficiently close between the claims as a second distinct 
condition for the application of Article 6(1). She clearly follows on this point the softer line of Freeport: 
‘98. In cases in which comparable claims are made and the requirements under the applicable law 
are essentially comparable, application of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 is suggested, first 
of all, by the fact it is possible to avoid inconsistencies which could result from a different 
appraisal of the facts by two courts. In so far as common stipulations under Union law are 
concerned, this is also supported by the avoidance of legal inconsistencies. Considerations of 
procedural economy also indicate the existence of such a connection. However, in such cases the 
requirement that the anchor claim and the other claim arise in the context of a single factual 
situation is of crucial importance. The risk of a different appraisal of the facts and a different legal 
assessment can justify a transfer of jurisdiction under Article 6(1) of the regulation only where 
this is predictable for the defendant.’34  
The expression 'crucial importance' has perhaps been incorrectly interpreted by the Court as an invitation 
to leave the final evaluation to the national jurisdiction. This is clearly not the line along which the 
advocate general has built her reasoning. A 'crucial importance' for her leads rather to a conditio sine qua 
non. The decisive character of this aspect clearly points towards a first precondition which is distinct and 
cannot be compensated by another one!  
One thing is clear. After Painer, neither the first nor the second condition established in Roche Nederland 
remains intact. If Freeport softened the second condition, Painer does the same thing to the first condition. 
This is even more important if one considers that these two conditions are no longer followed by a 
separate evaluation (or prediction) of the danger of irreconcilable judgments in the specific case.35 The 
existence of a single factual situation and of a sufficient juridical concordance is on this point sufficient 
because it is only a question of a risk of irreconcilable judgments. This risk cannot be tested in absolute 
terms and therefore one needs to fall back on the two above-mentioned conditions as clear indicators of 
the existence of such a risk.36 
5. The Solvay Case: Clarity at Last? 
                                                          
34
  Conclusions of Advocate General Trstenjak in case C-145/10 above, para. 98. 
35
  Conclusions of Advocate General Trstenjak in case C-145/10 above, para. 100. 
36
 Contra Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV et al v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535, para. 32. 
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The litigation between Solvay and Honeywell appeared to provide an ideal opportunity to clarify the 
matter.  Since both Freeport and Painer had departed from the guiding line established by the Court in 
Roche Nederland, it was interesting to see the matter again considered in a case regarding a European 
patent, after a case without relation to intellectual property (Freeport) and another case concerning 
copyright (Painer). 
Solvay sued in the Netherlands a Dutch company of the Honeywell group for the infringement of a 
European patent.37 The infringement involved the sale in certain European countries of a product identical 
to the product protected by the patent.  A similar activity had been performed in a number of European 
countries by two companies of the Honeywell group, based in Belgium. Solvay argued that the principal 
claim was directed against a Dutch company on the basis of Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation and 
claimed that there was a close relation with the claims against the two Belgian companies, which are part 
of the same group and which performed the same activity. Solvay further stated that on the basis of such 
close relation Article 6(1) was applicable to determine the competence of the sole Dutch judge as a forum 
connexitatis.38 
The application of the Freeport approach regarding the condition of an identical juridical basis was 
foreseeable, because national rules on patents have been harmonised as much as – or even more than- 
copyright rules, whereas the directives have left more room for different national approaches. And the 
existence of the same facts is perhaps more plausible if one supposes that companies of the same group 
align their behaviour between them and perform the same infringing activity by selling the product 
concerned in different European countries. Thus, Solvay could have followed this line and have extended 
the application of Article 6(1) to a scenario such as in Roche. It could have. 
A first part of the ruling rehearses the well-known arguments in relation to Article 6(1). One can recognise 
the softened approach of Freeport, as well as clear references to Painer. But then a paragraph that refers to 
Freeport, Painer, and Roche Nederlands, in order to make the same points, takes the Court back to Roche 
Nederland.39 The way in which a European patent is treated by Roche Nederland is simply repeated, 
without discussion. Thus, the Court chooses the easier way by arguing that Solvay is an exception to Roche 
Nederland, on the basis of the specific factual situation of Solvay. Or, in the common law terminology: 
‘Solvay is distinguished from Roche Nederland’. The Court reckons that the two Honeywell companies, 
Dutch and Belgian, are active on the Finnish market. If Article 6(1) were not applied, we would have two 
rulings relative to the same activity in Finland.40 This suggests that, according to the Court, there would be 
a real risk of irreconcilable judgments. The overlapping activities in Finland make the difference with the 
Roche Nederland scenario, where each company was only active in one country. And on the basis of the risk 
of irreconcilable judgments Article 6(1) applies to this exceptional situation.41 
Obviously, Solvay represents a revival of the Roche Nederland doctrine. The rulings in Freeport and Painer 
are clearly important, but the Court is not prepared to give up completely the Roche Nederland approach. 
In this sense, Solvay does not provide the clarifications one could have hoped for.42 
One of the interesting aspects of Solvay43 is that, despite the fact that only a limited part of the claims 
against each defendant refers to the same activity in the same country, the whole case is brought before a 
                                                          
37
  Case C-616/10 Solvay SA/Honeywell et al. [2012] ECR I-0000, CJEU 12 Jul. 2012, See the annotations of G. Sorreaux in 
[2012] 9 TBH 941. 
38
  On the judgment in the Netherlands see Ph. de Jong, O. Vrins and Ch. Ronse, 'Evoluties in het octrooirecht' [2011] 11 
TBH. 
39
 Case C-616/10 Solvay SA/Honeywell et al. [2012] ECR I-0000, CJEU 12 Jul. 2012, paras. 19-26. 
40
 Case C-616/10 Solvay SA/Honeywell et al. [2012] ECR I-0000, CJEU 12 Jul. 2012 CJEU 12 Jul. 2012, para. 28. 
41
  See G. Cuniberti, 'ECJ rules on separate proceedings and interim relief' (2012) Conflictoflaws.net 
(http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/ecj-rules-on-separate-proceedings-and-interim-relief/). 
42
  Case C-616/10 Solvay SA/Honeywell et al. [2012] ECR I-0000, CJEU 12 Jul. 2012, para. 28. 
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Dutch court on the basis of Article 6(1).44 Even the claims that are not irreconcilable are brought before 
the forum connexitatis. The emphasis appears to be put on the defendant. If there is a risk, all claims 
against the defendant are brought before the forum connexitatis. This has obviously the advantage to avoid 
a fragmentation between different claims. Additional proceedings in the forum connexitatis for part of the 
claims are in fact not an ideal solution.  
6. Conclusion 
Perhaps it is a pity that the text of Article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation was not changed, except that it is now 
Article 8(1). Few certainties remain when the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice is analysed in 
detail. An attempt at clarification by the legislator would have been welcome, even though this is never a 
guarantee of success. 
It is still true that Article 6(1) provides the option to join all parties and all claims in the forum 
connexitatis, when two defendants act jointly in one or more countries, although the defendants are 
domiciled in different countries. An elementary example is provided by the infringement of a European 
patent in a country  implicating the acts of two defendants, respectively as the manufacturer and the 
distributor of the infringing product. And Solvay likewise specifies that Article 6(1) applies to all scenarios 
where two or more defendants infringe the same intellectual property right in the same country by acting 
in an identical way. This type of overlap necessarily produces a risk of irreconcilable judgments, and 
Article 6(1) averts this risk.  
Leaving that aside, every certainty and predictability has disappeared. Parallel rights and parallel claims 
that do not overlap remain in a state of confusion when one examines in detail the approach of the Court of 
Justice. The risk of irreconcilable judgments remains the criterion for the application of Article 6(1); and in 
the assessment of this risk the two requirements of a single factual and single legal situation remain the 
principal factors. However, the strict requirement of a single factual situation established by Roche 
Nederland is questioned by Painer. A certain form of coordinated action between the defendants is no 
longer indispensable, and even less a form of coordinated action. This is merely one of the factors that a 
tribunal has to consider to determine if Article 6(1) can be applied. The same applies in relation to the 
strict requirement of the same legal basis. After Freeport, this requirement has likewise been softened and 
the existence of the same legal basis is only a factor that the tribunal will have to consider. The central 
factor is now the balance that has to be struck by the national judge. This obviously makes the test flexible, 
but it is yet uncertain whether there are still two requirements that have to be individually met, on the 
basis of two separate balancing acts performed by national judges, or whether a single assessment which 
considers both factual and legal factors needs now to be performed. Obviously, the application of a uniform 
law and the risk that two judges apply this uniform law in a different way are very important factors in the 
application of Article 6(1).   
The Court has constantly reminded us that Article 6(1) has not the aim to exclude a mere divergence and 
that the application of Article 6(1) needs a greater and more relevant risk. However, the question has to be 
asked whether the combined effect of Painer and Freeport does not open wide the door to the application 
of Article 6(1) in cases where there is but a mere risk of divergence. Was the only real risk in Painer not the 
divergent application of copyright law, strongly harmonised (the same infringing acts in Austria, to which 
Austrian law applies, could be judged differently by a German judge against a defendant domiciled in 
Germany than by an Austrian judge against a defendant domiciled in Austria)? 
This greater flexibility thanks to the balancing action performed by the national judge has also the 
drawback that the legal predictability, and hence also the legal certainty, two factors that the Court 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
43
  See also G. Grassie and R. Buchan, 'Does Solvay remove the need for a Unified Patent Court (UPC) in Europe?' (2012) 
41(9) CIPAJ 512-515. 
44
  Case C-616/10 Solvay SA/Honeywell et al. [2012] ECR I-0000, CJEU 12 Jul. 2012, paras. 29-30. 
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considers crucially important, in the Brussels I Regulation in general and in Article 6(1) in particular, are 
practically totally lost. 
The introduction of this flexibility and of the balancing exercise are not the cause of the current problems. 
Going back to the strict approach of Roche Nederland is pointless and it would cause more problems than it 
solves. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that the flexibility is only acceptable inasmuch as the application 
of Article 6(1) is predictable. And there must be a real risk of incompatible judgments, not only a risk of 
divergence. This result can be obtained by keeping the two conditions separate and by applying them 
cumulatively. Freeport can provide guidance on the approach, under condition of a single legal situation. 
When it comes to the question of the requirement of a single factual situation, a minimum alignment 
between the actions of the defendants can be required as a conditio sine qua non. This would avert the risk 
of a simple divergence and ensure some predictability. We do not need a spider and its web, but at least 
some link should exist.  
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